SecurityCommunity.eu

Admiral Lutz Feldt, Member of the Wise Pen Team

Admiral Lutz Feldt is the former Chief of the German Navy, the President of the German Maritime Institute Bonn and one of the five Members of the Wise Pen Team, who issued a report for the EDA on Maritime Surveillance in support of CSDP.

Please find the report here (PDF)

Interview Questions

0:00 Brief introduction of himself
0:21 What level of integration is needed and what is realistic [in EU Maritime Surveillance and Defence]?
1:45 Do you agree that we need a real cultural change in the member states regarding information sharing? How do you think such a cultural change could be achieved, and what would you expect from parliaments, political, administrative and executive levels to get there?
3:52 Do you think the French example could be a good model for the EU to organize maritime security in a large sense?
6:02 You stressed two information systems in maritime surveillance, the Maritime Security and Safety Information System (MSSIS) initiated by NATO and the Safe Sea Net. What�s the difference between the two of them and is there linking to bring the two of them together?
8:39 The Commission has launched two pilot projects to increase regional trust, data sharing, and cooperation between relevant actors. BlueMassMed for the Mediterranean and MARSUNO for Northern Europe. What are your expectations when it comes to these two pilot projects and do you have any idea when results will be available?
11:17 One of the key roles of the navy has traditionally been to protect and say �Free Sea Routes�. In the context of maritime surveillance, do you think navies could support EU and national agencies, and are we getting awareness of the EU as a sea power now?

Gesine Meißner, MEP

Gesine Meißner MEP is working on a draft report evaluating new challenges and the progress made in the field of an EU Integrated Maritime Policy. For SecurityCommunity.eu she speaks about the EU Integrated Maritime Policy and the EU as a maritime power.

You ca find the draft report here (PDF).

Interview Questions

0:40 Can you explain the progress that has been made since the EU Integrated Maritime Policy in 2007?
1:12 Do you have any idea how that latter aspect, [little knowledge about EU Integrated Maritime Policy by the public, the people, the countries and politicians], could be changed, making it more and better known?
2:02 Could you explain a little bit what is the gist and focus of your report?
3:45 Focusing on the information sharing and the maritime surveillance parts [of the EU Integrated Maritime Policy] how do you see the importance of these two and what role do they play in your report?
6:43 Given this new integrated approach to all maritime technology, do you think that today or somewhere in the future we can speak about the European Union as a maritime power?

A Clear Path to Critical Infrastructure Resilience

by Erik Floden, SRA International, Inc.

Content provided bywww.sra.com

Despite the remarkable technological advances of our modern societies, the horrific terrorist attacks and disasters of the last decade have exposed an uncomfortable truth about a government�s first responsibility to protect its citizens - it remains impossible for governments to protect their citizens at all times from disruptive and often tragic events. The evidence has been piling up: September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, 2005 London bus and tube bombings, 2004 Madrid train bombings, Beslan school hostage crisis, and the Mumbai attacks, as well as some of the worst natural disasters in history, including, the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami, the destruction of New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina and numerous, devastating earthquakes.

Since our vulnerabilities are too numerous and our resources to protect everything at all times are insufficient, the logical response to this devastation has been an emphasis on enhancing the resilience of individuals, communities, cities and regions. Governments, academics and commentators in the European Union and United States have placed a particular emphasis on the resilience of critical infrastructure. Critical infrastructure resilience is desirable because our infrastructure produces and provides a broad range of vitally important products, services and/or capabilities upon which society heavily relies. Governments, often with little or no ownership or control of critical infrastructure, are urging critical infrastructure owners and operators to �be� resilient or �improve� the resilience of their critical infrastructure as we lack the ability to protect it all from disruptive events. However, governments have been slow to provide concrete goals, objectives, or specific guidance on how this should be accomplished. Further, many critical infrastructure owners and operators remain skeptical that resilience is nothing more than old wine in new bottles, and that current practices, while not labeled �resilience�, have for many years enhanced the resilience of critical infrastructure.

As a risk management strategy, most for-profit enterprises have built some level of resilience into their operations and operational planning. In a free market environment, government should not generally concern itself with the success or failure of a specific business enterprise, but instead with systemic failure of the ability to access the products, services and capabilities that critical infrastructure provides and society relies upon (e.g. clean drinking water, emergency response capabilities, transportation, energy, information technology and communications, banking and financial transactions). For example, while the forced shut down of a specific electricity generating plant is not in and of itself the concern of governments, the extended loss of electric power to hundreds of thousands of people, particularly a loss of power that supports the production of other critical goods and services, is a public risk that government should seek to manage by working with owners and operators to mitigate the duration and severity of service disruptions. If government requires a higher level of resilience to meet public policy objectives, it must define its expectations and find ways to encourage critical infrastructure owners and operators to extend their resilience efforts beyond what the market may justify. As a first step government must clearly articulate its resilience goals � at the national, regional, sector, and facility level � and must provide owners and operators with the tools and incentives to enable them to achieve desired policy outcomes.

The next step is identifying the basic elements of resilience to meet those goals. Providing a clear path to improved critical infrastructure resilience can resolve many of the persistent questions about the difference of resilience from previous and existing preparedness and protection initiatives. It will also provide critical infrastructure owners and operators � large and small, rich and poor, complex and uncomplicated � a clear path forward to improve their resilience. The path to resilience need not be complicated. At a minimum, it requires following four steps, each described in turn below.

Know What�s Critical
Understand the Risks
Be Ready to Respond
Have a Recovery Plan

Know What�s Critical

Strengthening critical infrastructure resilience requires proper identification of the products, services, and capabilities that society heavily relies upon and the critical functions and associated support systems that maintain their continuance. Examples of critical functions include the capability to treat waste and deliver potable water, generate and deliver electricity, or grow and deliver food to consumers.

The ultimate measure of critical infrastructure resilience is the ability to minimize disruptions to critical functions during an adverse event and continue to provide products, services, capabilities that customers expect. In resilience planning, maintaining the elements that support critical functions is primary and managing risk to specific assets and systems should be undertaken within the context of their role in maintaining these functions.

Once critical functions are identified, public and private sector partners should agree upon resilience goals � including, as appropriate, at the international, national, regional, local, and critical infrastructure sector levels � and develop strategies to minimize interruptions to these functions. If critical functions are interrupted, planners must understand the extent to which their customers will accept a disruption or loss of essential products and services. These considerations not only impact corporate profit and loss, but also have larger economic and societal implications.

Understand the Risks

Resilience planning should be guided by an understanding of the risks critical infrastructure owners and operators face. Critical infrastructure owners and operators that are ignorant of their risks remain so at their own economic peril�catastrophic events have a way of weeding out less resilient businesses. This process is standard operating procedure for many critical infrastructure owners and operators.

Risk assessments determine the likely adverse events, existing vulnerabilities to those events, and the extent to which they will impact a business� operations. Some risks are difficult to anticipate (Icelandic volcanoes being a recent example), and for others there are little or no actions available to mitigate the impact. However, risk, to the extent possible, must be identified, quantified and planned against. Risk can be managed and is the essential step to improving resilience.

Be Ready to Respond

A timely and effective response to adverse events can make the difference in maintaining critical functions and continuing to provide essential goods and services or the complete dissolution of an operation. A timely and effective response will limit initial damage, halt further degradation, and minimize, if not eliminate, the impact to critical functions.

Achieving resilience requires critical infrastructure owners and operators to focus their response planning on ensuring that their critical functions do not degrade to an extent where they will not be able to provide the products, services or capabilities that their customers expect. A good response seeks to decrease the time between a disruptive event and the response, as well as increase the capability of the response to limit further damage which facilitates a rapid recovery.

Have a Recovery Plan

Resilient critical infrastructure is not only capable of anticipating and absorbing disruptive events, but most importantly, capable of restoring operations to pre-event levels quickly. Despite the importance of a rapid and efficient recovery it is often the most overlooked of the four resilience steps. A rapid and efficient recovery reduces the loss critical functions suffered from a disruptive event and returns critical infrastructure to pre-event levels of operation.

A good recovery plan will include procedures and resources to repair damage to an infrastructure�s capacity to provide essential goods and services. The plan will also establish a process to assess and correct flaws in the organization�s application of the basic resilience elements. This process evaluates whether the risks and critical functions, including any internal and external dependencies, were properly identified in the plan. It will also measure the speed and capacity of the response and recovery against goals and assumptions included in the plan. Finally, rapid and efficient recovery could increase the capacity of a resilient organization beyond the previous baseline, as the identification of previous weaknesses is addressed and improved upon.

The Resilient Critical Infrastructure

Following the four steps above, the resilient critical infrastructure owner and operator recognizes the vital importance of the products and services they provide to their customers and more broadly the society and economy of which they are a member. If there is an interruption in the delivery of their goods and services they know what their customers will find unacceptable, and given the significance of the products and services they provide to the society and economy, understand what their government partners expect for the provision of those goods and services. They have conducted a thorough analysis to identify the critical functions that support and enable the delivery of their critical goods and services and understand their external and internal dependencies. They have a clear picture of the risks they face and how those may impact their critical functions. To ensure their critical functions are maintained, the resilient owner and operator has developed response capabilities and understand how the capacity of the response will mitigate disruption to critical functions. The resilient owner and operator has not only considered what will be needed to recover to pre-event operation, but has developed a plan with the necessary tools and resources, and is also prepared to take advantage of any disruptive event to improve the efficiency and quality of the critical goods and services they provide.

Conclusion

There are limitations to simplifying the complex problem of critical infrastructure resilience to the four elements above. However, governments must begin to engage with critical infrastructure partners to outline their expectations for critical infrastructure resilience, and where necessary be prepared to identify specific targets and goals if they exceed existing capabilities. This national-level guidance and coordination function is one of the key areas where government can play a powerful leadership role in ensuring its citizenry are safe and its economy robust. In the absence of such coordination, national- and international-level preparations will be disconnected, lacking preparedness standards, as well as the information required to quickly assess a threatening situation and align response and recovery resources to address the problem. Finally, a clear path for those at the facility level to assess current capabilities against the basic resilience elements presented above is necessary to identify gaps and implement necessary solutions.

Erik Floden is a Principal at SRA International with expertise in resilience policy, critical infrastructure metrics, and pandemic planning. Since 2007, he has worked on critical infrastructure issues with the Department of Homeland Security, Office of Infrastructure Protection, and recently supported a review of DHS resilience activities and strategic planning for the DHS Office of Policy. Formerly, Erik was a Legislative Assistant in United States Senate responsible for homeland security, defense, and foreign policy issues.

SRA International provides strategic consulting to federal, state and local governments, as well as the private sector. Some of SRA's principal clients include the Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies. SRA's strategic consulting services include the spectrum of infrastructure protection and resiliency issues: Preparedness, Vulnerability Reduction, Consequence Mitigation, Response, Recovery, and Reconstitution. This opinion is part of a monthly series pertaining to various experiences with the implementation of infrastructure protection strategies. For more information, please contact Craig Wilson at Craig_Wilson@SRA.com. http://www.sra.com/services/security-privacy/critical-infrastructure-key-resources.php.

Checks and balances in the European Union after Lisbon

Content provided by The European � Security and Defence Union www.euro-defence.eu/

Checks and balances in the European Union after Lisbon � the role of the European Parliament in Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

by Professor Dr. Jerzy Buzek, President of the European Parliament, Brussels/Strasbourg

In today�s global and interdependent world, the European Union faces a daunting list of major challenges, including climate change, energy security and migration. It is living in the world exposed to both conventional and unconventional risks and threats, raging from natural and mad-made disasters to economic crises, global pandemics, cyber-warfare, piracy, ethnic conflicts, extremism and terrorism.

EU citizens strive for security
Clearly, the European Union can not afford to remain just a by-stander in global affairs, especially when its citizens are rightfully demanding from their governments and from the EU better protection, more predictability and an ever higher degree of security, stability and prosperity. The time has come for the EU to become a player, and not just a payer, on a global stage, to become a real actor not only on major foreign policy issues, but also in the matters of security and defence. The European Parliament, which has recently acquired new powers, has also an important role to play.

The EU towards becoming a global player
The Lisbon Treaty has created important tools to increase the visibility and the effectiveness of the EU�s external actions, yet much more is needed to make good use of these tools and to make sure that they translate into a more coordinated and effective EU policy. I believe that in order for the EU to be able to reassert and reposition its leadership on global issues, it needs first and foremost to show the capacity to tackle the challenges and solve the problems on its own borders. Only if the EU proves it is able to help solve the frozen conflicts in Nagorno-Karabach, Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, if it proves able to bring stability and prosperity to the entire Western Balkan region, to name just a few, it will be treated by other global powers as a serious, capable and effective partner.

Energy security for Europe � a prerequisite
Moreover, key to the EU�s global potential is its own security and independence, especially in the field of energy. Therefore, the creation of a common external energy policy and of a European Energy Community, further diversification of energy resources and further efforts to make the energy trade in the region more open, transparent and predictable, would help the EU to escape the hostage situation of energy dependence and allow it to be more principled and outspoken on an equal-level dialogue with the major partners like Russia and China.

Coherence in politics and in actions- a sign of power
Finally, the new posts of President of the European Council and the EU�s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, created by the Lisbon treaty, as well as the soon-to-be established European External Action Service, should be used in the most effective way in forging a common position. They should enable the Union to finally prove to the world that it can speak in one voice on the most important global issues, whether concerning security challenges in Afghanistan and Iraq, or the peace process in the Middle East and the nuclear ambitions of Iran.

CSDP � the parliamentary dimension
Following the decisions made by the Cologne and Helsinki European Councils, the security and defence policy of the Union has developed rapidly: As of now 24 missions and operations have been launched within this framework, seven of them military ones. Let me just mention the most recent ones: the antipiracy naval operation off the coast of Somalia, the observer mission in Georgia and the most recent one, the military mission in Uganda to train Somali security forces.

The European Parliament should become a partner for scrutiny?
Decisions concerning war and peace are certainly the most important decisions elected politicians can take. These should not only be left to the executive branch. As such, we feel that in addition to the scrutiny exercised by the parliaments of the Member States, the European Parliament should also be part of this endeavour. Therefore, after the 2004 European elections the European Parliament set up a Subcommittee for Security and Defence. During these years, the European Parliament has also built up structures for information, budgetary control and legislation. The European Parliament and information
Firstly, if you want to exercise oversight, you have to be well-informed. The Subcommittee therefore has regular public meetings with the Council about planned and on-going missions. As regards confidential information, the Parliament has set up a Special Committee whose members are security cleared. This Special Committee has met at regular intervals with the EU High Representative for special briefings and has had access to confidential documents.
The European Parliament is aiming as well to be in a position to vote on well-prepared recommendations before an operation is finally decided on by the Council. Information visits within the countries concerned give us the necessary background to do so, as illustrated by the cases of operations or missions in the Republic of Congo, Chad, Kosovo, and Georgia. We followed this up by then visiting the troops under the EU flag to see how their mandates were being implemented.

Powers through budgetary control
Secondly, we should not forget that so far we have had only seven military but seventeen civilian missions. The civilian missions are financed from the European budget and Parliament has to approve the respective budget lines. This concerns for example the CSDP missions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Georgia. The use of the EU budget to finance these missions is monitored through regular meetings between the Council and the chairpersons of the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Budget as well as the chairman of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence. Another element of parliamentary scrutiny by the European Parliament concerns research and development for equipment needed for civilian and military missions by the EU. This also covers satellite-based observation and navigation (Kopernikus and Galileo) as well as security research. Parliament voted, by a large majority, for Galileo to be available not only for civilian missions but also for the EU�s military operations. About 5 bn Euro have been earmarked for these purposes in the 7th Research Framework Programme approved by Parliament and the Council. These budgetary decisions came about also due to strong input from the European Parliament.

Legislative powers and cooperation with national parliaments
Thirdly, the European Parliament participates in legislative decision making and has become a true co-legislator following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. For instance, just recently the Parliament and Council took legislative decisions on the so-called �defence package�: the two directives concerning defence procurement and intra-community transfers for defence products. It was the first time Parliament had acted as a legislator in matters of defence.
Last but not least, there is our cooperation with the parliaments of the Member States. The chairpersons of the defence committees of the national parliaments, European Parliament and parliaments of candidate countries meet at regular intervals and discuss on-going developments in CSDP. With the Treaty of Lisbon in force, this cooperation is being reinforced further.

Parliamentary scrutiny and the way forward
These examples show that the first steps have been taken on the way to a checks and balances system in the CSDP area where the European Parliament, together with national parliaments, is ready to play its part in a full parliamentary scrutiny of the security and defence policy of the European Union.
Moreover, the European Parliament will remain committed to its vision of the European Union that enhances its strategic autonomy through a strong and effective foreign, security and defence policy. A policy that is so needed to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security. A policy that is indispensable to protect the security of our citizens, defend our interests in the world and uphold our founding values. A policy that would help promote effective multilateralism, international law and advance the respect for human rights and democratic values worldwide.

Professor Dr. Jerzy Buzek

Jerzy Buzek was born on 3 July 1940 in Smilovice what is now in the Czech Republic. In 1963 he graduated from the Silesian University of Technology, specializing in chemical engineering. He has worked for many years as a scientist, including at the Polish Academy of Sciences and Cambridge University, and since 1997 has been a professor of engineering. In the 1980s he was an activist of the democratic and anti-communist Solidarity movement. In 1997 he was elected to the Sejm, the lower house of the Polish Parliament, and appointed Prime Minister of Poland, a position he held until 2001. From 2004 to 2009 he served as a Member of the European Parliament, being a member of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy and Rapporteur on the EU�s 7th Framework Programme for Research and Development. On 14 July 2009, he was elected President of the European Parliament.

Prof. Sven Biscop, Director Security & Global Governance Programmme, Egmont

Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop, Director of the Security & Global Governance Programmme at Egmont - The Royal Institute for International Relations, makes the case for an EU Grand Strategy.

General Hakan Syrén, Chairman of the European Union Military Committee

General Håkan Syrén, Chairman of the European Union Military Committee, talks about the Battle Group concept, the Swedish Presidency's approach to make them more flexible and the possibility and likeliness for its deployment.

Norbert Glante, MEP

You may activate english subtitles at the top of the video screen

Norbert Glante (S&D, Germany), Member of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, talks about his draft report on the proposal for a regulation on the European Earth observation programme (GMES) and its initial operations. He reports, among other, about the need for amendments, the necessary increase in financing and the time table.

Krzysztof Lisek, MEP

In this interview of our series "A Grand Strategy for the European Union", Krzysztof Lisek (EPP, Poland), Vice-Chairman of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence, gives his views if the European Security Strategy is sufficient in this regard.

Jolyon Howorth, Professor of Europ. Politics and Military Policy, Univ. of Bath

Jolyon Howorth, Professor of European Politics and Military Policy at the University of Bath and a visiting Professor of Political Science at Yale University outlines his �Grand Strategy� plan for Europe to become a collective power.

Interview Questions
0:00 Question on the necessity of a �Grand Strategy� for the EU.
3:54 Question on how the EU should go about building this strategy.
7:37 Question on the tension between fixed criteria and the necessary room for discretion in formulating foreign policy.
13:16 Question on potential of the External Action Service.

Kees Klompenhouwer, EU Civilian Operations Commander, Council

Kees Klompenhouwer, EU Civilian Operations Commander, Council of the European Union, in an interview about the role of the European Union in Afghanistan.